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The Islamic Republican Party of Iran in the Factory: Control over Workers’
Discourse in Posters (1979–1987)
M. Stella Morgana
Leiden University, LIAS (Leiden Institute for Area Studies), Leiden, Netherlands
ABSTRACT
This article discusses how May Day posters, released by the Islamic Republican Party of Iran (which
represented the core of Ayatollah Khomeini’s supporters in terms of state power between 1979 and
1987), started to express a new socially constructed identity for workers within the factory. By
tracking hidden meanings and the particular use of visual language, it investigates why various
styles and symbols were woven together. Finally, it shows – through the analysis of discourse in
posters – how a process of appropriation of leftist symbols developed, in order to nullify a
perceived ideological threat to the Islamic Republic, represented by both secular Marxists groups
and those who, in Khomeini’s words, “mixed Islamic ideas with Marxist ideas and have created a
concoction which is in no way in accordance with the progressive teachings of Islam” [Khomeini,







We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of
power in negative terms: it “excludes”, it “represses”, it
“censors”, it “abstracts”, it “masks”, it “conceals”. In
fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces
domains of objects and rituals of truth.1
By traversing and “producing” reality, according to
Michel Foucault, power is accepted: it generates knowl-
edge. Researching workers and state–power relations in
post-revolutionary Iran, and looking at posters released
during May Day celebrations, two crucial questions
arise. What values were assigned to specific represen-
tations of workers, in order to create, consent and
allow Khomeinists to be accepted? What were the
regimes of truth which surrounded the factory environ-
ment after the 1979 revolution?
The following article analyses posters as part of a
broader set of productive aspects of power that came in
contact with the Iranian industrial workplace throughout
the 1980s. The goal here is to explore how the ruling
clergy (organised politically, under the umbrella of the
Islamic Republican Party (IRP),Hezb-e Jomhuri-e Eslami
which was founded in 1979) was accepted in the field of
labour relations, beyond disciplinary measures or
repression. Therefore, this article seeks to decipher how
power circulated within and outside the Iranian factory,
in terms of the production of knowledge, meanings and
signs.2
By producing and re-producing these meanings and
signs of knowledge, through language and visual rep-
resentations, three main players influenced the factory
environment: workers as an inherent part, Ayatollah
Khomeini and the IRP.
As Khomeini warned in his speech on the eve of the
Iranian new-year in 1980, factories may represent, at
that time, the places where “counterrevolutionaries”
could “create tumult”:
The government is duty bound to provide the means of
labour and production for workers, farmers and
labourers. However, they too should know that strikes
and slowdowns will not only strengthen the super-
powers, but also cause the hope of the oppressed people
in the Islamic and non-Islamic countries who have risen
to be turned into despair. The people of each city, as
soon as they learn of a strike at a factory, should go to
that place and see what they want. You should
identify the counterrevolutionaries and make them
known to the people. The noble people of Iran can no
longer pay unearned salaries to a number of ungodly
people.
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My dear workers, you should know that those who every
day create tumult in a corner of the country and who
basically come to the field with the logic of force are
your headstrong enemies and wish to turn you away
from the path of the revolution. They are dictators,
who if they ever come to power will not allow anyone
to breathe. You should fight against them in all fields
and identify them to the public as your number one
enemy and reveal their connection and dependence
upon the aggressive East or the colonial West. The gov-
ernment is duty bound to severely punish those who are
involved in such actions.3
Starting from the end of 1979, the IRP gradually per-
meated the factories through the establishment of the
Islamic Associations (IAs).4 The IAs represented a tool
of intervention within the workplaces, in order to oppose
and eventually replace the shuras (factory councils that
emerged after the fall of the Shah in 1979, aiming at
workers’ control from below).5
A new identity of the worker as homo islamicus started
taking shape in pictures (particularly in May Day posters)
as well as in practices. First, it emerged through the naskh
and surat Arabic calligraphies, which immediately con-
nect the audience to Islam. Second, through written calls
to action for workers, which never alluded to the working
class (tabagheh-ye kargar), but always referred to the more
general worker (kargar). Third, it did so by representing
workers as unidentified black or white shapes in work
suits, often in a socialist realist style. The IRP’s interven-
tion within the factory through the IAs and the daily
response to the workers’ ideological threat (by hanging
up posters on the walls, by broadcasting State speeches
during breaks, by identifying “non-conformist” workers)
had a twofold meaning. On the one hand, it was a strategy
to go beyond the discourse of class/working class and to
incorporate the kargar into “the broader category of mos-
taz’afin, the downtrodden”, who were all “slaves of God”,6
by weaving together the three dimensions of Khomeini’s
discourse: religious, revolutionary, populist. On the other
hand, it was a method to identify, incorporate and finally
neutralise the threat.
In Staging a Revolution. The Art of Persuasion in the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Peter Chelkowski and Hamid
Dabashi affirm that the Iranian Revolution of 1979 in
Iran was “a pictorial revolution, a revolution in full
semiotic control of the representation of itself”.7 Accord-
ingly, pictures started to “talk”,8 to tell their stories on
walls, banners and money. They began to express dissent
and to spread new messages. This article examines how
the IRP utilised posters to communicate with industrial
workers.9 It also shows how the party exerted its
power10 over labourers in order to win their support
during the revolutionary period and throughout all the
1980s.
Through the analysis and the comparison of
seven different posters, distributed in Iranian factories
and used during May Day celebrations, what becomes
evident is the Islamisation of the concept of labour.
This symbolic appropriation of the Iranian workers’
desires and struggles was also made by incorporating a
variety of political sources, some even including see-
mingly contradictory messages.11 Clenched fists, indus-
trial machinery elements, broken chains and flowers,
often in red, were merged together with religious ima-
gery and terminology, and Qur’anic verses written in tra-
ditional naskh Arabic calligraphic style. The outcome is
what the philosopher Roland Barthes called a “myth”.12
It is a system of communication where images,
objects and words become “natural” and eternal to the
observer. All the above-mentioned elements are woven
together in a way that is – using Barthes words – “per-
fectly explicit, but it is immediately frozen into some-
thing natural; it is not read as a motive, but as a
reason”.13 The intentions behind the use of every sign
do not seem to be hidden or ambiguous. Yet, they result
natural and normalised, as they were already suitable for
communication.14
Posters became part of a larger discursive
campaign, carried out by the IRP’s subgroups closer to
workers15 that can be summarised in the oft-quoted
saying of Ayatollah Khomeini: “Labour is a
3Khomeini, “We Shall Confront the World with Our Ideology,” 88.
4Bayat, Workers and Revolution in Iran, 100–1.
5Ibid.
6Bayat, “Does Class Ever Opt Out of the Nation?” 195.
7The authors explicitly refer to the “Islamic” aspects of the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Nevertheless, different secular forces participated in the fall of the Shah’s
regime. See Chelkowski and Dabashi, Staging a Revolution, 9–10.
8Chelkowski and Dabashi, Staging a Revolution, 9.
9Shortly after the Revolution, in the process of Khomeini’s consolidation of power, leftist supporters were cut off from the new leadership as effective rivals. The
IRP appropriated revolutionary political organs. See Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 71 and Dabashi, Theology of Discontent, 17.
10Revolutionary political posters were not only a manifestation of the IRP’s power, but also a tool of mobilisation for workers who were part of the discourse. See
Foucault, “Subject and Power.” See also Bayat, Work Politics and Power, 71–6.




15There were at least six factions within the IRP: (1) group from the clergy, loyal to Khomeini and engaged for a long time in anti-Shah political activities; (2)
bazaari merchants; (3) supporters of the conservative Hojjatieh Society; (4) followers of the right-wing head of Toilers Party, Mozafar Baqa’i; (5) Members
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manifestation of God.”16 The lack of political homogen-
eity in the party was clearly manifested in the support
given by some of Hezb-e Jomhuri-e Eslami’s members
to IAs in the factories, who supported the Khomeinist
idea of class antithesis between the lower and upper
class (tabagheh-ye payin and tabagheh-ye bala),
oppressed and oppressors (mostazafin andmostakberin),
poor and rich ( foqara and sarvatmandan).17
2. Rhetoric and Discipline: The Double Task
of the IRP
Ten days after the overthrow of the Shah, Khomeini gave his
political blessing to the IRP’s foundation –which emerged as
the political core of his supporters in terms of state power –
despite his initial disapproval of clergy’s involvement in party
politics. Although Khomeini never became a member of the
IRP, he decided to support it because the main competitors
in the struggle for power at that time, such as the communist
Tudeh Party, the Islamic-leftist People’s Mojahedin of Iran
and the Liberation Movement of Iran, were all organised
in political parties.
Starting from its establishment, the IRP rose up
among other revolutionary forces to become the unified
voice of Khomeinists within the Islamic Republic. The
party began to represent: (1) a powerful political instru-
ment against all other opponents and adversaries, among
pro-revolutionary forces; (2) a fundamental player in the
process of objectification of workers. Yet, the existence of
factional divisions within the party since its foundation
would have also affected discursive and political strat-
egies related to labour. In order to better understand
the subsequent developments, this following explains
how the IRP’s main wings dealt with labour discourses.
On 18 February 1979, Khamenei, Hashemi Rafsan-
jani, Bahonar, Beheshti and ‘Abdul-Karim Mousavi
Ardebili were put in charge of the party central commit-
tee.18 They were all clerics and Khomeini’s loyal suppor-
ters. With their guidance, the IRP gradually penetrated
the Islamic Republic, by playing key roles in the newly
established institutions. For example: (1) during the
first parliamentary elections in 1980, it won the majority
of seats in the Majles; (2) after the impeachment of Bani
Sadr (deposed because of his attempt to reduce clerics’
moves to gain space and power), and following the assas-
sination of Mohammad ‘Ali Rajal, ‘Ali Khamenei became
President.19
By trying to channel all the revolutionaries into one
party with an explicit religious label, the party had a
double function. On the one hand, it had to keep mobi-
lising workers around the new Republic. On the other
hand, it had to control and discipline the factory,20 in
order to protect the Islamic state from potential
opponents or foreign plotters. Starting from labourers’
everyday working life, the party sought to regulate
workers’ behaviour and penetrate their ideas by spread-
ing the Islamic conception of labour.
A political purge of adversaries in and out of the work-
places was carried out by any means. The elimination of
rivals was considered the first step towards the implemen-
tation of the Rule of Jurist, the velayat-e faqih. Between the
end of 1979 and the beginning of 1982, a crackdown
against workers’ unions started.21 Independent shuras
were liquidated and, as Bayat explained, the Labour
House or Worker’s house (khaneh-ye kargar) “previously
a free headquarters for workers’ assemblies, became the
centre of pro-IRP shuras and Islamic Associations”.
As Iran’s chronicles tell,22 revolutionary collective
enthusiasm and ardour characterised the immediate after-
math of the February 1979 revolution. From universities
to factories, from the bazaar to the streets of Iran’s main
cities, the revolutionaries celebrated the fall of the Shah.
Nevertheless, the sense of liberation and relief from mon-
archist repression for some groups was soon over. The
pro-Khomeini clerics took de facto control at the helm
of these new waves of repression. Moreover, by 1981 the
People’s Mojahedin, Sazman-e Mojahedin-e Khalq, were
banned and their offices closed: arrest warrants were
issued and mass executions were carried out. In 1982, a
harsh repression against the Tudeh Party23 – accused of
conspiring against the Islamic Republic – started and
less than one year later, on 4 May 1983, the Islamic
with a background in other religious groups of associations, with some followers, such as ‘Abbas Poshtibani and Hosein Musavi. See also Behrooz, “Factionalism
in Iran under Khomeini,” 610 and Moslem, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran, 53–76.
16Bayat, “Does Class Ever Opt Out of the Nation?” 194.
17See Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 26–7.
18See Behrooz, “Factionalism in Iran under Khomeini,” 600–1.
19Social Science Research Council, Princeton University and Syracuse University, Iran Data Portal, “1980 Parliamentary Elections” and “1981 Presidential Elections”
and Bakhash, “Elections under the Islamic Republic.”
20Here the concept of discipline is understood as in Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, 146, as follows:
Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience). In short, it
dissociates power from the body; on the one hand, it turns it into an “aptitude”, a “capacity”, which it seeks to increase; on the other hand, it reverses the
course of the energy, the power that might result from it, and turns it into a relation of strict subjection.
21Rahnema, “Workers Councils in Iran,” 69–93.
22See Gueyras, “Liesse populaire a Téhéran.”
23See Mather, “Iran’s Tudeh Party,” 611–27.
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Prosecutor-General officially dissolved the party, which
actually survived and kept operating clandestinely.24
The Iranian power structure was in transformation,
and it developed along a double-track system, according
to the 1979 Constitution: President and Supreme Leader,
Majles and Council of Guardians. The leading role of the
clerics became soon evident in the newly established
Islamic Republic, and the IRP gradually penetrated the
core of the state with many of its members in key
positions. Yet, as previously discussed, it was not a single
party system. The IRP fiercely tried to remove any
obstacle in its path to the consolidation of the Islamic-
revolutionary rule. This project lasted until 1987, when
the IRP was dissolved.
Although the central nucleus of the party agreed on
the main strategy, from the very beginning the IRP hid
divisions and controversies. In fact, when the party was
established, there were five different groups, with distinc-
tive political positions: (1) clerics which supported anti-
Pahlavi protests, mainly supporters or former students of
Khomeini, (2) bazaaris loyal to the Ayatollah, (3) conser-
vatives from the Hojjatieh Society, e.g. ‘Ali Akbar Parvar-
esh and Velayati, (4) other groups of conservatives-
rightists, close to Mozafar Baqa’i, (5) religious represen-
tatives of other small revolutionary groups, including
Jalal al-Din Farsi, ‘Abbas Poshtibani and Mir-Hossein
Mousavi.25
At the dawn of the second Majles, there were de facto
three main factions.26 First, the conservatives, close to
President Khamenei and supported by the bazaaris,
who praised private ownership and opposed the mini-
mum wage for workers. Second, the radicals, followers
of the Prime Minister Mousavi, who promoted a Labour
Law able to “safeguard workers from capitalists”, and
pushed for decisive state intervention in the economy.
The third wing was the domain of the pragmatists,
driven by Rafsanjani and the new Iranian middle class,
in favour of a dual or mixed economy.
At that time, the countrywas economically undermined
by the Iran–Iraq war, and the state needed to increase the
productivity of Iranian workers. In this context, the regu-
lation of work became one of the main controversies
between radicals and conservatives.27 As Ashraf pointed
out, the conservatives “even opposed a minimum wage,
arguing that in the Islamic free market, labour accepted
the proposed wage of its free will”.28 Referring to the rad-
icals, Ashraf suggested that by advocating for “a ceiling
on agricultural land, confiscation of lands in urban areas,
nationalization of foreign trade, labour laws to protect
workers against the owners of capital, their program
added up to a form of statism or state socialism”.29
Furthermore, in those years rivalry among factions
was also centred on the interpretation of fiqh (Islamic
jurisprudence). This issue would have affected IRP
labour policies, and thus modes of workers’ objectifica-
tion. The conservatives were oriented towards a tra-
ditional interpretation, which considered the Qur’an
and Prophet Mohammad’s derived ordinances the
only ones to govern a Muslim state.30 Conversely, both
the radicals and the pragmatists were aligned to a
dynamic understanding of religious jurisprudence.
This latter group believed that Shi’i jurisprudence also
had to encounter the changing status of a society.31
Although the IRP’s main task was to implement the
Khomeinist revolutionary discourse within Iranian
society, the party’s leadership did not conceal their oppo-
sitional political views and publicly admitted their pos-
ition. For instance, on 21 August 1983, Khamenei
declared, as reported by the IRP’s newspaper Jomhuri-e
Eslami:
Many people are trying to say that this party belongs to a
certain group. They say it is the party of the clergy
because there are five clergymen on the top. They say
it is the party of the bazaaris. Some believe that this is
the party of the President [Khamenei], the Prime Min-
ister [Mousavi] and the Majles speaker [Rafsanjani].
Moreover, he was convinced that there was no difference
in having different ideas concerning Islamic jurispru-
dence or economy:
There are differences of opinion among the members of
the central committee but both follow the (doctrine) of
[the] Imam and agree on main issues. It is ok for the two
camps to think differently on issues related to fiqh or the
economy.32
24Jahanpour, “Iran: Rise and Fall of the Tudeh Party,” 156–8.
25Ibid., 598–600.
26The second Majles lasted from 1984 to 1988. The key roles were in the IRP’s hands, with the radical Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi and the more con-
servative President ‘Ali Khamenei. This shared management, together with theMajles speaker Hashemi-Rafsanjani, resulted in open conflict between the differ-
ent factions of the party, which ended only in 1987 with the dissolution of the party. See also Baktiari, Parliamentary Politics in Revolutionary Iran, 99–144.
27In the period between 1984 and 1988, the confrontation was mainly focused on domestic issues, and due to the conflict with Iraq, foreign policy was margin-
alised in the political debate. It is worth highlighting the pivotal role of IRP leadership in prompting Ayatollah Khomeini to accept the UN resolution for a
ceasefire. See also Behrooz, “Factionalism in Iran under Khomeini,” 607 and Amuzegar, Iran’s Economy under the Islamic Republic, 34.
28Ashraf, in an interview with Abrahamian and Paul, “There Is a Feeling That the Regime Owes Something to the People,” 13–18.
29Ibid.
30Moslem, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran, 49–50.
31Ibid.
32See Jomhuri-e Islami, August 21, 1983, quoted in Moslem, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran, 67.
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Nevertheless, throughout the 1980s, the factional
rifts became unbridgeable. In 1987, the IRP dis-
solved itself because the leadership did not succeed
in merging all its disparate parts together.33 The
Labour law, as a disciplinary and partial instrument
of state power,34 was one of the crucial issues facing
the party.
In Figure 1, issued by the IRP in the 1980s (the exact date
is unknown),35 the sentence “Islam is the only supporter of
the worker”, proclaimed by Ayatollah Khomeini, stands as
the basis of the picture. It is written in four different
languages: Arabic, German, French and English, in order
to communicate the Islamic message to a variety of audi-
ences and appeal to an international population.36 The
Figure 1. Workers as holy warriors. Issued by the IRP, 1980s. The University of Chicago Library.
33For the speeches of Rafsanjani and Khamenei on the failure of the IRP project, see also Arjomand, After Khomeini, 33–4.
34See Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 141.
35See “Guide to the Middle Eastern Poster Collection,” University of Chicago Library, https://www.lib.uchicago.edu/ead/pdf/meposters-0002-024.pdf, box 2, n. 24.
36Chelkowski and Dabashi, Staging a Revolution, 254.
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poster was distributed on the occasion of 1 May, Inter-
national Labour Day, by the Islamic Republic Party as writ-
ten in English in the bottom left corner.37 By giving specific
symbols as keys of understanding, it shows workers kneel-
ing for prayer. In the foreground, theman in themiddle rep-
resents the vertex of the poster for an imaginary observer.
Yet, he is not a real centre: he is portrayed as one among
others,whoare all at the same level, all sittingon theground.
In his pocket, a wrench is clearly recognisable. Other work
tools are visible on the floor: a spanner and a hammer. Just
before them, there are threemohr, small blocks of clay, used
by Shi’ite Muslims during their daily prayers’ prostrations
and symbolising the earth.38 In a particular socialist realist
style,39 the workers’ expressions on the poster transmit
their strain and their toil. One of them wears a papaq, tra-
ditional Azerbaijani hat, reflecting the Azerbaijani back-
ground of many workers in Iran, especially in Tehran.40
Labourers’ facial features are drawn in thick black pencil
sketches, against a red and yellow background of industrial
scales, which symbolises justice.41
For the Khomeinists of the IRP, the dichotomy of
justice/injustice was a crucial instrument for social
demarcation between mostakbarin (the advantaged-
oppressors) and mostaz’afin (the disadvantaged-
oppressed part of the Islamic ummah, in Persian
pronounced ommat).42 It was a way of borrowing and
then reformulating with an Islam terminology the
same concept of social justice which has been part of
the Iranian left for years, before the establishment of
the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the Qur’an (4:75) it is
explicitly mentioned that the Muslim community has
to fight for people subjected to tyranny and oppression:
“Why is it that you do not fight in the way of God and in
the way of the deprived?” Indeed, the workers, kargaran
in Persian, were considered part of themostaz’afin, ready
to struggle against the oppressors. The fact that there is a
weapon placed in the left corner of the poster is emble-
matic. Moreover, above the workers’ heads, a saying of
Imam Ja’far al-Sadiq stands out: “He who toils for his
family is like the mojahid (holy warrior) in the way of
God.” It is written in Arabic, in naskh calligraphic style
(the style used to copy the Qur’an) and with diacritical
notes. It has been argued that text written in Arabic
with this style is considered as the word of Allah.43
Hence, calligraphy becomes crucial in conveying mess-
ages. It is immediately recognisable, even though the audi-
ences are not always able to understand the meanings
behind the sentences.44 For example, the quotation by
Khomeini is written in Persian, precisely in nasta’liq calli-
graphic style and without diacritical sings, and it is
immediately comprehensible for all Iranians. Therefore,
by visually making labour equate with religion (through
the use of Arabic), workers were immediately brought
into the Islamic sphere. This mechanism deactivated the
iconographic power of secular motifs in the poster.
3. The Appropriation of Historical Leftist
Symbols
Religious references are mixed with symbols of socialist
realism (e.g. machinery) also in Figure 2, issued by the
Hezb-e Jomhuri-e Eslami, as written in Persian in the
right corner of the image.45 Commemorating the
Figure 2. White silhouettes of workers with raised clenched fists.
Issued by the IRP, 1980s. The University of Chicago Library.
37See “Guide to the Middle Eastern Poster Collection,” University of Chicago Library, https://www.lib.uchicago.edu/ead/pdf/meposters-0002-024.pdf.
38The most favoured clay is that from Karbala in Iraq, where the martyrdom of Imam Husein occurred.
39Fischer and Abedi, “Revolutionary Posters and Cultural Signs.”
40See Abrahamian’s history of May Day in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Khomeinism, 73.
41See Fischer and Abedi, “Revolutionary Posters and Cultural Signs.”
42See also Bayat, “Historiography, Class, and Iranian Workers,” 183.
43As explained by Chelkowski and Dabashi, Staging a Revolution, 101.
44At the time of the Revolution, there was a 63.5% illiteracy rate among Iranian population over 15 years old. Among the rest of the society, not everybody was
able to read Arabic. See Mehran, “Social Implications of Literacy in Iran,” 194–211.
45See “Guide to the Middle Eastern Poster Collection,” University of Chicago Library, https://www.lib.uchicago.edu/ead/pdf/meposters-0002-040.pdf, box 2, n. 40.
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International Labour Day (the 11th of Ordibehesht in the
Persian calendar), the poster combines black factory
symbols, such as an anvil, a cogwheel and a chimney
stack, with the Qur’anic verse that reads: “There is no
God but Allah.”
Here the Arabic language is an instrument utilised to
fuse both the revolutionary movement and the workers
into Islamicity. White silhouettes of workers with raised
clenched fists, against a red background, appear on the
top half of the image. What is once again worth noting
is the merging of different graphic traditions, in order
to create a new semiotic representation of workers. For
example, broken chains, identified with oppression,
come out from the smokestack.
On the one hand, this image appropriates the Marxist
narrative related to the famous phrase: “Proletarians have
nothing to lose but their chains.”46 On the other hand, it
suggests a new key for interpreting the world of the
factory, as a religious alternative to the other political
actors who were in competition for the “property” of
the Workers Day.47 First, the poster brings the audience
to this path by using the surat Arabic calligraphy, which
is immediately linked to Islam. Second, it does not allude
to proletarians or working class tabagheh-ye kargar, but it
mentions the word kargar/worker only referring to May
Day. Third, labourers in the poster are represented as uni-
dentified white shapes in work suits. Thus, this specific use
of symbols suggests that the kargar’s identity is not
defined by belonging to a particular class. Khomeinists
of the IRP incorporated the kargar into “the broader
category of mostaz’afin, the downtrodden”, who were –
as Muslims – all “slaves of God”.48 Indeed, the Islamic
revolution and the new Republic proved their legitimacy
in the name of the oppressed, a large category which
included not only workers but also urban and rural
poor and the unemployed.49 In this process of transform-
ation, the concept of tabagheh-ye kargar, of a working
class as a collective specific entity, was dissolved and
placed under the Islamic umbrella.
4. Labour as a Religious Duty
By publicly presenting labour as a religious duty and as
an expression of God, through posters, the IRP proposed
a new framework for the workers’ life and thusly for their
control: the Islamic Republic. Figure 3 illustrates this new
conceptualisation well.50
A wrench, a shovel and a hammer stand out in this
poster, released for the Commemoration of International
Labour Day during the 1980s. The three black work tools
seem to come out of the soil, together with a red rose that
ties them together. The caption which stands above
reads: “Islamic Republic: Cultivator of the individuality
and value of the worker.”
Flowers have a lot of meanings in the Persian tradition
and literature. The rose in particular was often used as a
motif for beauty and love in Persian poetry.51 Nevertheless,
in this specific context, the red rose symbolises the sacrifice
of workers, the blood split for their struggles. It is interest-
ing to note that this meaning overlaps with the one con-
veyed by the socialist iconography. Furthermore,
according toAbrahamian, the IRPpreferred roses to carna-
tions because the latter were evenmore frequently inserted
into Iranian leftist groups’ posters,52 particularly those
issued by the Tudeh Party, with a Soviet influence.
Figure 3. Work tools coming out of the soil together with a red
rose. Issued by the IRP, 1980s. The University of Chicago Library.
46Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, 62.
47The competitors were: the Tudeh Party (the communist “Party of the Masses”), a coalition of leftist groups headed by the Fedayin and the Maoist Paykar, and the
Mojahedin. The IRP’s members initially paid scarce attention to International Labour Day and only in April 1979 they realised that the leftist groups were organ-
ising more important celebrations for International May Day. Thus, the IRP started its preparation for the occasion. See Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolu-
tions, 510–25, and Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 71–87.
48See Bayat, “Does Class Ever Opt Out of the Nation?” 195 and Bayat, “Historiography, Class, and Iranian Workers,” 197.
49Bayat, “Workless Revolutionaries.”
50See “Guide to the Middle Eastern Poster Collection,” University of Chicago Library, https://www.lib.uchicago.edu/ead/pdf/meposters-0002-034.pdf, box 2, n. 34.
51Hanaway, “Symbolism of Persian Revolutionary Posters,” 31–50.
52Ibid. See also Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 71–87.
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5. Between Iranian Particularism and Islamic
Universalism
The above-mentioned recourse to multiple iconogra-
phies, by giving space to different layers of meaning,
enabled the merging of national and international
elements: the Persian–Iranian particularism with the
Islamic universalism.53 For instance, the process of
assimilation of May Day into the Islamic calendar pro-
vided a global connotation to the IRP. By Islamising
the Iranian calendar and in particular International
Labour Day, the Khomeinists also wanted to redefine
what, up to that moment, represented an important
rhetoric emblem of the Iranian leftist groups in workers’
minds. The IRP’s ideologues did not create another
labour day, but they instead integrated May First’s sym-
bolic force into the Islamic circle. In this sense, theHezb-
e Jomhuri-e Eslami’s posters “talk”.54 They are not just a
mere manifestation of a new specific political dis-
course,55 but they constitute the Islamic political dis-
course. By introducing discontinuities with the past
with the large use of Islamic symbols in the public
space, and by reassigning new meanings to the pre-
existent, they suggest a new mode of thought.56 As Sre-
berny Mohammadi pointed out, after the Revolution,
“public space potentially heralded a public sphere”.57
Therefore, in analysing the conditions of emergence
of this new discourse, one sees the pre-existing imaginary
being redefined and reconstructed in a single new
discursive field.
Figure 458 is representative of how the idea of a reli-
gious-inspired workplace was spread, through the use of
predominant iconographic messages (two hands holding
work tools and a red rose) over linguistic ones.
In fact, the only written messages are: on the upper
part of the poster, the 11th of Ordibehesht, the Inter-
national Labour Day in the Persian calendar; on the bot-
tom, the signature of the Hezb-e Jomhuri-e Eslami.
In Figure 5, from the middle of stylised orange smoke-
stacks, a black human arm emerges, as if it was another
chimney.59
Holding a pink flower with its clenched fist, it
reaches the orange sun behind it. The caption directly
“talks” to the kargar in Persian: “Worker: May your
arm gain strength in the service of God and the
people.” There are three interesting elements to high-
light. First, in Figure 5, the linguistic message is driven
by the iconographic symbols. It is not central. It is
located at the bottom of the poster. Second, the lotus
flower, which stands against the awakening-sun
instantly brings to mind the creator, God. Indeed, in
the Persian tradition of art and architecture, the lotus
flower, growing from water and opening up towards
the sun, is a symbol of light and creation.60 The sun
also represents the light coming from God, the heart
of the universe.61 This amalgam between language
and image and its consequent registration by the audi-
ence, represents, using Chelkowski–Dabashi’s words,
“the deepest ideological forces operative” in the revolu-
tionary domain.62
Figure 4. Hands holding work tools and a red rose. Issued by the
IRP, 1979–1987. Hoover Institution Archives.
53See also Ram, “Multiple Iconographies,” 97.
54As suggested by Chelkowski and Dabashi, Staging a Revolution, 9.
55See Ram, “Multiple Iconographies,” 97.
56See Foucault, “Politics and the Study of Discourse,” 53.
57Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi, Small Media, Big Revolution, 25.
58See Hoover Political Posters Database (Stanford), http://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/20468/11i-urdibihisht-ruzi-jihanii-kargar?ctx=ca270c86-f6ee-43e1-
9811-f2f3e4bd7f76&idx=2 and Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 75.
59See “Guide to the Middle Eastern Poster Collection,” University of Chicago Library, https://www.lib.uchicago.edu/ead/pdf/meposters-0007-269.pdf, box 7,
n. 269.
60See Nazari and Adelzade, “Manifestation of Lotus in Art and Architecture of Ancient Iran, India and Egypt,” 92–100.
61See Qur’an 10:5, 71:16, 24:35.
62Chelkowski and Dabashi, Staging a Revolution, 105.
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6. Transformations of the Workplace: The
Construction of a New Field of Knowledge
If “power produces realities” and establishes “rituals of
truth”, as Foucault argued in Discipline and Punish,
posters represent a manifestation of these rituals.63
Then again, as “there is no power relation without the
correlative constitution of a field of knowledge”, posters
are a segment in a broader field of knowledge.64 In this
sense, the IRP’s visual political campaign, representative
of the Khomeinist idea of a new Iran, was an important
actor in the regime’s celebration of the Islamic view of
labour. It expanded revolutionary axioms into the fac-
tories and into the public spaces. Therefore, walls started
to express struggles.
Nevertheless, it was not a question of mere manifes-
tation of messages. Posters became a tool of intervention
in the workplace. They were distributed in the factories,
together with banners with recurrent slogans of the IRP,
such as “Workers, Toilers, Islam is For You”, “Our Party
is That of Allah, Our Leader is Ruhollah.”65 They were
hanging on the walls, in order to remind the workers
to perform what Khomeini called “the divine duty of
production”,66 in a truly Islamised work environment.
Throughout this process, the factory became more
than a workplace: it turned into what Bayat defined as
a “barricade” of agirs (labourers) against koffar (infidels),
in other words, an imaginary battleground for Islamised
labourers against the infidels.67
As written in Persian in Figure 6, a worker’s hands
(which are ready to fight with all their strength against
the oppressors) will never go to hell.68
This religious transformation of the Iranian factories
was put into practice by the members of theIAs for
labour, which were supported by the IRP and conceived
as an alternative to the independent shuras (workers’
councils). IAs were established for educational and social
purposes, as mandated by the Iranian constitution, but
soon they became instruments of control over workers.
They reshaped the factory and its atmosphere in differ-
ent ways: by hanging up posters on the walls, by
Figure 6.Worker’s hands ready to struggle. Issued by IRP, 1980s.
Hoover Institution Archives.
Figure 5. Worker: May your arm gain strength in the service of
God and the people. Issued by the IRP, 1980s. The University
of Chicago Library.
63Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 210.
64Ibid., 27.
65Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 73.
66The religious conception of work was widely employed by the IRP to guarantee workers’ efforts in raising production, during Iran–Iraq war (1980–1988). Clergy-
men were sent to factories: their mission was spreading the Khomeini’s idea of labour as a manifestation of God. See Algar, Islam and Revolution, 231–54 and
Khomeini, “We Shall Confront the World with Our Ideology.”
67Bayat, Workers and Revolution in Iran, 186.
68See Hoover Institution Political Posters Database (Stanford), http://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/20505/in-ast-dasti-kih-biatishi-duzakh-nakhvahad-
sukht-payamba?ctx=ca270c86-f6ee-43e1-9811-f2f3e4bd7f76&idx=6 and Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 77.
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broadcasting State speeches during breaks, by identifying
“non-conformist” workers and by calling up labourers
for pro-regime rallies.69
7. Why the IRP Engulfed Historical Leftist
Symbols
Along this line, the IRP’s ideologues contributed to the
redefinition of secular motifs historically related to the
Iranian left. However, it was not a mere procedure of
redetermination of certain symbols, but it was a process
of engulfment and appropriation. By applying this sys-
tematic method, the IRP absorbed historical leftist
icons into its political discourse.70 The purpose was to
annul their symbolic power in the eyes of the workers,
exactly as it happened with the Islamisation of the Inter-
national Workers’ Day. For example, on 22 April 1982,
Jomhuri-e Eslami, the newspaper founded by the Islamic
Republic Party in May 1979, reported a statement
released by an official of the Labour House: May Day
“is a distortion that the Marxists of Second International
in Paris have committed”. Then, the source added: “On
the basis of our researches, we have found out the fact
that the attitudes of the protagonists and the main par-
ticipant force of the May Day were in fact religious.”71
Furthermore, a closer look at the slogans reveals another
attempt to create distance between the IRP and the his-
torical Iranian left. First, productivity was praised as a
religious duty. Indeed, workers received promises of hap-
piness in the present and in the future, as written in the
inscription of Figure 7.72 Second, accumulation of capital
was not condemned as in the Communist narrative, even
though it was not considered as an invitation to the free
market, especially by the faction closer to Khomeini,
which supported state-sponsored redistributive policies.
8. Conclusion
As discussed at the beginning of this article, the see-
mingly contradictory use of secular motifs was recurrent
in the posters released immediately after the Revolution
and over post-revolutionary period of the 1980s. The
blending of various ideological sources was perhaps
inevitable in the growth and consolidation of what Daba-
shi defined “a victorious utopia becoming an established
ideology”.73 Yet, what is peculiar is how this heterogen-
eity of symbols was channelled into a single discursive
field of power. The reference to a single discourse is
not meant to say that the IRP, even though the
expression of the Khomeini’s ideology, was a monolithic
entity. Nevertheless, the posters could be interpreted as a
visual projection of the different souls of the IRP, which
were all oriented towards an utter absorption of leftist
imaginary, in order to politically nullify its potential
ideological danger within the factory.
Throughout the 1980s, the different dimensions of
discourse, concerning control over workers and the pro-
cess of neutralisation of leftist organisations, evolved
along three main phases: (1) the perception of a threat;
(2) the reaction to the recognised danger; (3) and the
assimilation of the enemy. Indeed, together with the
West and the capitalists, the leftist groups, were per-
ceived as threats against the success of the revolution.
Since the earliest strikes in 1978, workers (whose pol-
itical ideas at that time were not close to Khomeini’s
message) were united against the foreign influence:
In unity with the fighting people of Iran, the purpose of
our strike is to destroy despotism and eliminate the
Figure 7. Promises of happiness for workers. Issued by the IRP,
1980s. Hoover Institution Archives.
69Bayat, Workers and Revolution in Iran, 186.
70See also Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 71–88.
71Bayat, Workers and Revolution in Iran, 192.
72Here is understood as well-being in this and in the next world. See Hoover Institution Political Posters Database (Stanford), http://digitalcollections.hoover.org/
objects/20511/saadati-kargar-dar-partavi-islam-va-iman-dastmuzd-va-ru and Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 76.
73Dabashi, Theology of Discontent, 17.
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influence of foreigners in our country, and create an
independent, free and progressive Iran. These goals
are the indisputable rights of the people. The people
shall utilize all the means of self-sacrifice to achieve
these goals.74
To overcome the difference between the Islamic-revolu-
tionary discourse and that of the workers, Khomeini and
IRP members reshaped the refrain against the “colonial”
and “dictator”West by channelling the class struggle into
the religious dimension through the dichotomies such as
moral/immoral and godly/infidel. What happened was
what Hall defines as “a re-articulation of the relations
between the subjects and discursive practices”75 and a
new form of Iranian revolutionary identity emerged.
If the West was considered a threat, the Marxists ideas
coming from the West were incorporated into a unique
idea of the enemy. As a reaction, the perceived danger
was isolated in the speeches within and outside the fac-
tory, as the “counterrevolutionary” Other, in other
words, the enemy for all the revolutionaries, including
the workers. Workers’ May Day slogans began to wave
together the religious dimension to the revolutionary
one: “Islam is for equality and social justice”, “the pro-
blems of the East come from the West, especially from
American imperialism”.76
The secular rhetoric was engulfed by absorbing its
own symbols. Therefore, it can be argued that this pro-
cess of assimilation was a clear reaction to nullify the lef-
tist secular groups who initiated the fluid anti-Shah
strikes among the workers. In fact, the Marxist slogan
“Workers of the world, unite!” was turned into
“Oppressed of the world, unite!” and workers began to
shout it as a rallying-cry.77 Furthermore, the IRP’s May
Day posters were an example of a visual counter-tactic
to fight the perceived danger. The new identity of the
worker as homo islamicus started taking shape in posters
as well as in practices. First, it emerged through the
naskh and surat Arabic calligraphies, which are recog-
nised by the audience as the styles connected to Islam.
Second, through calls to action for workers, referred to
the more general kargar/worker. Third, it was expressed
through the representation of labourers as unidentified
black or white shapes in work suits. By incorporating
the symbols and the imaginary of the perceived threat
into another field discourse, the clerics of the IRP actu-
ally refashioned under an Islamic umbrella traditional
signs which have been part of the leftist background
for decades. They aimed at producing a ritual of truth
for all those who participated in the revolution. It was
within this context that the rituals of truth circulated
within the entire social body surrounding the factory,
and thus, controlled it not only – as Foucault warned –
in negative terms.
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